At a glance
| Item | Finding |
|---|---|
| Body | Australian National Audit Office (ANAO), which supports the Auditor-General for Australia |
| Type | Not a regulator. An audit and oversight body: it audits Commonwealth entities and reports to Parliament. It cannot direct or sanction anyone. It is in scope because its role is to hold the Commonwealth to account |
| Office holder | Dr Caralee McLiesh PSM, appointed "16th Auditor-General for Australia with effect from 4 November 2024" for a ten-year term (anao.gov.au, The Auditor-General; Prime Minister's media release) |
| Enabling law | Auditor-General Act 1997 (Cth), compilation 18 (17 October 2023; no later amendments found at 11 October 2026). The Act has no objects clause |
| Report under review | Annual Report 2025-26 (published 22 September 2026) |
| Record examined | 25 annual reports, 2001-02 to 2025-26; Corporate Plan 2026-27; Portfolio Budget Statements 2026-27; JCPAA Budget Day Statements of 25 March 2025 and 12 May 2026; JCPAA statement on the Major Projects Report (6 March 2026); the Senate resolution of 1 April 2026 and the Auditor-General's reply; Senate estimates opening statements (October 2025, February 2026); the Speaker's schedule of government responses (30 June 2026); ACAG independence report (November 2025); ANAO web pages; the Auditor-General Act and the Public Accounts and Audit Committee Act 1951 |
| Money and staff, 2025-26 | Total expenses $106.3m; revenue from government $99.2m; net deficit $0.768m; average staffing level 434 (AR 2025-26 pp 32-33, 116) |
| Output, 2025-26 | 243 mandated financial statements audits (100%); 39 performance audits against a target of 38 to 42; 21 performance statements audit opinions (AR 2025-26 pp 2, 24, 27, 29) |
| Proposed overall grade | C |
| Short reason | The ANAO does its statutory core job, the audit of the Commonwealth's accounts, completely, and its audits are respected by the committee it reports to. But apart from the 2015-16 double-dissolution year it now tables fewer performance audits than at any time in 25 years, 39 against the 48 Parliament has asked for, after a net deficit in every year since 2018-19 that the government has not funded. The public has no right of request and gets no feedback as of right, and the ANAO has never counted what the public sends it. Its 2025-26 annual report reports less about itself than the year before. It is also the only body Regulator Review has reviewed so far that sample-tests the self-reported figures behind one of its own headline measures and publishes the result |
The grade follows the six criteria settled for Regulator Review on 11 October 2026. Section 11 sets out each criterion, its grade and the reasoning.
1. What the body is for
1.1 What the Act says
The Auditor-General Act 1997 has no objects clause. Its purpose has to be assembled from the provisions that create the office and confer its functions.
- There is to be an Auditor-General for the Commonwealth (s 7). "The Auditor-General is an independent officer of the Parliament" (s 8(1)).
- "… the Auditor-General has complete discretion in the performance or exercise of his or her functions or powers. In particular, the Auditor-General is not subject to direction from anyone in relation to: (a) whether or not a particular audit is to be conducted; or (b) the way in which a particular audit is to be conducted; or (c) the priority to be given to any particular matter" (s 8(4), which opens "Subject to this Act and to other laws of the Commonwealth").
- The Auditor-General "must have regard to" the audit priorities of the Parliament determined by the Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit (JCPAA) and the Committee's reports (s 10).
- The Australian National Audit Office is established by s 38.
Its functions fall into three groups:
- Financial statements audits. Auditing the annual financial statements of Commonwealth entities is mandatory and comes first in the Act (Part 4, Division 1, s 11; s 12 for the consolidated statements).
- Performance audits. The Auditor-General may conduct a performance audit of any Commonwealth entity or company (s 17), with two exceptions: a government business enterprise "only … on request by the Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit" (s 17(2)), and a Commonwealth partner that is part of a state or territory government only "at the request of the responsible Minister or the Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit" (s 18B(1)(a)). Performance audits are the discretionary part of the work.
- Performance statements audits. "The Auditor-General's functions include auditing annual performance statements of Commonwealth entities" (s 15).
The ANAO has strong information powers in an audit (ss 32-33). It has no power to compel anyone to act on what it finds.
1.2 What the ANAO says it is for
"The ANAO's purpose is to support accountability and transparency in the Australian Government sector through independent reporting to the Parliament, and thereby contribute to improved public sector performance" (anao.gov.au, About the ANAO, updated 22 July 2026).
1.3 Who it serves
Its primary client is Parliament, and in particular the JCPAA. It says it does not serve the public directly: "As the ANAO does not provide services directly to members of the public, it does not have a service charter" (AR 2022-23 p 125).
1.4 Who holds it to account
On the text of the law and the record:
- The JCPAA must examine every Auditor-General report, considers the ANAO's draft budget and sets Parliament's audit priorities (Public Accounts and Audit Committee Act 1951 s 8), and approves or rejects the recommended appointment of the Auditor-General and the Independent Auditor (s 8A). It cannot direct the Auditor-General: "Nothing in subsection (1) authorises the Committee to direct the activities of the Auditor-General or the Independent Auditor" (s 8(1A)).
- An Independent Auditor, appointed under s 41, audits the ANAO's financial statements each year (s 44) and "may at any time conduct a performance audit of the Audit Office" (s 45). "The ANAO also requests that the Independent Auditor audit its performance statements" (AR 2025-26 p 87). The current Independent Auditor is Mr Shane Bellchambers, appointed from 1 April 2024 to 31 October 2028 (AR 2025-26 p 87).
- The Commonwealth Ombudsman can investigate the ANAO's administration. "There were no reports on the operations of the ANAO during the reporting period by a parliamentary committee or the Commonwealth Ombudsman" (AR 2025-26 p 87).
- "The Freedom of Information Act 1982 provides the Auditor-General with an exemption from the provisions of the Act. In 2015, the Australian Information Commissioner determined that the Auditor-General's exemption extends to the ANAO" (AR 2025-26 p 95).
The FOI exemption and the absence of any public right to request an audit are features of the law, not choices made by the ANAO. They are not held against it in the grading.
2. The test
The core test is the gap between what the body is meant to do and what the record shows it does. For an audit office the test has four parts:
- Does it audit what the law requires it to audit, completely and on time?
- Does it look widely enough, through discretionary performance audits, that the prospect of audit is real across the Commonwealth?
- Does its work change anything: are its recommendations implemented, not merely agreed?
- Does it answer, to Parliament and to the public, including about itself?
3. The mandatory work: financial statements and performance statements
The ANAO "completed 100 per cent of the 243 mandated financial statements audits" in 2025-26, plus 51 audits by arrangement under s 20, a total program of 294 (AR 2025-26 pp 18, 24). On-time delivery was 81% against a target of 85%, not met (AR 2025-26 p 24, Measure 3).
Performance statements audits test whether entities' published performance information is reliable. They reached 14 in 2024-25 (September dataset), and in 2025-26 the ANAO issued 21 opinions, 100% of those required, but only 48% on time against a target of 100% (AR 2025-26 p 29, Measure 8). For 2026-27 the on-time target has been lowered: "The target for this performance measure has been revised from the ANAO Corporate Plan 2025-26, decreasing from 100 percent to 85 percent over the forward years, which aligns with Measure 4" (Corporate Plan 2026-27, Measure 10). Measure 4 is the 85% timeliness target for financial statements. The plan also says the ANAO "will not expand its performance statements audit work".
On quality, "This year's reports on the ANAO's Quality Management Framework and Integrity Framework concluded that the frameworks were operating effectively" (AR 2025-26 p 2). The quality mechanism records two higher-risk findings and that remediation procedures were required in two financial statements audits, which did not affect the supportability of the audit opinions (AR 2025-26 p 22).
Regulator Review's assessment: the mandatory work is done in full. Timeliness of the newer performance statements work is poor, and the target has been lowered, which the ANAO explains as alignment with its financial statements target.
4. The discretionary work: performance audits
4.1 Output against target, 25 years
| Year | Target | Performance audits | Average staffing | Total expenses $m |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2001-02 | 46 | 46 | 284 | 50.3 |
| 2005-06 | 44 | 46 (restated 50 against 51) | 313 | 64.1 |
| 2010-11 | 56 | 54 | 346 | 71.4 |
| 2014-15 | 49 | 49 | 336 | 76.6 |
| 2015-16 | 49 | 35 | 322 | 77.1 |
| 2016-17 | 48 | 58 | 312 | 74.7 |
| 2018-19 | 48 | 48 | 335 | 81.0 |
| 2019-20 | 48 | 42 | 323 | 79.7 |
| 2020-21 | 42 | 42 | 310 | 78.6 |
| 2021-22 | 40 | 40 | 326 | 86.4 |
| 2022-23 | 42 | 40 | 361 | 95.0 |
| 2023-24 | 45 | 45 | 413 | 104.1 |
| 2024-25 | 48, revised to 44 | 44 | 451 | 108.6 |
| 2025-26 | 38 to 42 | 39 | 434 | 106.3 |
Sources: annual reports 2001-02 to 2024-25 as extracted and checked in the September 2026 dataset (EXTRACT-ANAO.md, page cited per cell); AR 2025-26 pp 27, 32, 116. The 2015-16 figure reflects the double dissolution of 2016, during which reports could not be tabled; 2016-17 includes the deferred reports. From 1 July 2006 other audit types were folded into the performance audit count and 2005-06 was restated (AR 2006-07 p 31).
The ANAO tabled between 44 and 54 performance audits in every normal year from 2001-02 to 2018-19. It has tabled 40 to 45 since, and 39 in 2025-26, the lowest count in the series apart from the 2015-16 dissolution year. The lower bound of the 2025-26 target, 38, is the lowest target in the series; the previous lowest was 40 (2021-22). The 39 include three "rapid engagement" pilots, a new shorter product (AR 2025-26 p 26).
4.2 Why the number fell, in the ANAO's words
- 2024-25: "We revised our target number of performance audits for 2024-25 from 48 – the number the Parliament has requested – to 44, and further reduced our target for 2025-26 to a range of 38 to 42" (AR 2024-25 p 4).
- 2025-26: "The ANAO reported an operating deficit of $0.768 million in 2025-26 – reduced from a $6.515 million operating deficit in 2024-25. Achieving this required a reduction in the target number of performance audits from 48 in 2024-25 to 38 to 42 in 2025-26, and efforts to increase efficiency" (AR 2025-26 p 2).
- Senate estimates, October 2025: cost pressures "can only be dealt with through more efficient audit processes-which we continue to pursue – and a reduction in performance audit reporting, which is the main discretionary area of our work".
- Corporate Plan 2026-27: the ANAO "will maintain a historically low number of performance audits – between 38 and 42 – below the expectation of 48 audits set by the Parliament".
The figure of 48 comes from Parliament. The JCPAA "recommended in 2022, in its review of the Auditor-General Act 1997, that 48 discretionary performance audits should be performed by ANAO each financial year" (JCPAA Budget Day Statement, 25 March 2025, p 2).
4.3 What it costs
Average cost of a performance audit: $306,000 (2001-02), $403,000 (2005-06), $571,000 (2024-25), $603,000 (2025-26) (AR 2001-02 p 31; AR 2005-06 p 26; AR 2025-26 p 29, Table 3.7). The 2025-26 rise was "six per cent higher" in nominal terms and two per cent after inflation, against a target of no rise above inflation; the measure was not met (AR 2025-26 p 28). The September dataset deflated the 2024-25 figure: $571,000 was about level in real terms with 2001-02 ($567,000 in 2024-25 dollars) and below 2005-06 ($670,000).
4.4 What is and is not audited
The Act lets the Auditor-General audit almost any Commonwealth body. The record on integrity bodies is:
- Commonwealth Ombudsman: Report No. 41 of 2021-22, Management of Complaints by the Office of the Commonwealth Ombudsman (23 June 2022), concluded "The Office is largely effective in managing complaints directed to it" (anao.gov.au).
- Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity: Report No. 4 of 2018-19, Operational Efficiency of ACLEI (28 August 2018): "the ANAO has not been able to conclude whether ACLEI has been operating efficiently" (anao.gov.au).
- National Anti-Corruption Commission: an audit of its procurement is in progress, "Due to table: January, 2027" (anao.gov.au, read 11 October 2026).
Correction to the September 2026 working paper: it said no performance audit of the Ombudsman or ACLEI appeared in the annual reports. That was an absence of mention in reports that stopped listing every tabled audit after 2013-14 (section 9.1). The two audits above exist, and the working paper should be corrected.
The Online Compliance Intervention ("Robodebt"):
- On 26 May 2017 Andrew Wilkie MP asked the Auditor-General to audit Centrelink's automated debt recovery. The reply of 27 June 2017 said "I do not intend to re-examine this specific issue", because the Commonwealth Ombudsman had examined the scheme in April 2017, and said the Auditor-General would consider examining the matters within a proposed audit of the Department of Human Services' enforcement and compliance strategy (anao.gov.au, Requests: Centrelink's automated debt recovery programs).
- When the ANAO audited Services Australia's debt management, it excluded the scheme: "The audit did not examine the Online Compliance Intervention System For Debt Raising and Recovery (colloquially known as Robodebt)" (Auditor-General Report No. 28 of 2022-23, Debt Management and Recovery in Services Australia, para 1.19).
- After the Royal Commission, the Auditor-General wrote that "the report of the Royal Commission into the Robodebt Scheme highlighted the need for public sector entities to be able to provide assurance over the operation of automated decision-making" (AR 2023-24 p 6).
- The Royal Commission into the Robodebt Scheme reported in July 2023 and found the scheme was neither fair nor legal.
Regulator Review's assessment: no auditor catches everything, and the ANAO's decision in 2017 not to duplicate the Ombudsman's work was explained at the time. But no ANAO audit of the scheme while it operated has been identified, an MP's request to examine it did not produce one, and the later debt audit excluded it. The scheme's unlawfulness was established by the courts and the Royal Commission, not by an audit.
4.5 The end of the Defence Major Projects Report
The Major Projects Report was an annual review of Defence's largest acquisitions, prepared at the JCPAA's request since 2008. The annual report says: "In December 2025, we delivered the 18th and final annual Major Projects Report with the Department of Defence, a product that served the Parliament well for many years" (AR 2025-26 p 1). Its footnote gives the reason as the JCPAA's decision, citing "the increasing classification of relevant information" (AR 2025-26 p 27 fn 15).
The fuller sequence is on the public record:
- At the JCPAA Chair's request for a suggested way forward, the Auditor-General wrote to the Committee on 8 December 2025. She had formed a view that the report was no longer fit for purpose; the letter cited the growing non-disclosure of information by Defence and the cost of the assurance activity to the ANAO and Defence, proposed an alternative, and set out terms should the Committee wish to continue (letter attached to the Auditor-General's letter to the Senate President of 23 April 2026, anao.gov.au).
- The JCPAA "resolved not to request the Department of Defence and Australian National Audit Office continue to produce the Major Projects Report" (JCPAA public statement, 6 March 2026).
- On 1 April 2026 the Senate resolved "That the Senate requests the Auditor-General to urgently reinstate" the report.
- The Auditor-General replied on 23 April 2026: "I have come to the conclusion that the MPR is no longer fit for purpose as the vehicle to bring the transparency and accountability that it has in the past." She added that reinstating it in its current form "would require a request from the JCPAA under the Auditor General Act 1997" and "would also require reductions in the planned performance audit program given the ANAO's current resources" (anao.gov.au).
Regulator Review's assessment: the decision was the JCPAA's, on the ANAO's advice given at the Committee's request, and the main reason given was Defence's growing non-disclosure. It is recorded here because a long-running public transparency product ended in a period of funding pressure, the ANAO's advice cited cost, and the annual report's account gives the Committee's reason without mentioning the ANAO's own advice.
5. Does the work change anything?
5.1 Agreement
In 2025-26 the ANAO made 192 recommendations; "184 recommendations were counted as agreed, including 14 agreed with qualification, resulting in a total of 96 per cent agreed" (AR 2025-26 p 20). Fully agreed: 89% (Table 3.3, p 21). Agreement has been between 85% and 99% in every year since 2001-02 (September dataset).
Until 2022-23 only unqualified agreement counted. From 2023-24 a qualified agreement counts as agreed where "the qualification did not contradict the overall recommendation" (AR 2023-24 p 33). In 2017-18, when the old rule produced a miss, the ANAO wrote that entities that did not agree or disagree took an approach that "does not assist the Parliament in holding entities to account" (AR 2017-18 pp 32-33).
5.2 Implementation, and the ANAO's own test of it
The ANAO asks entities each year whether they have implemented its recommendations. In 2025-26 it reported "Implemented – 92% against a target of 70%" (AR 2025-26 p 14), relating to recommendations from audits tabled in 2023-24 (p 21).
It also tests those self-reports, through a series of follow-up audits of selected entities. The 2025-26 report says: "Self-reported implementation data is not independently audited at the time of reporting. Implementation audits have identified instances where recommendations reported as implemented were assessed as not fully implemented. Across the implementation audits completed to date, 25 per cent of recommendations reported by entities as implemented were assessed by the ANAO as partly implemented or not implemented" (AR 2025-26 p 21).
Earlier reports gave the cumulative "to date" figure as 20% (2021-22), 24% (2022-23), 18% (2023-24) and 29% (2024-25). Until 2023-24 the figure counted only recommendations found "not implemented"; from 2024-25 it also counts "partly implemented" (AR 2024-25 p 26 fn 7; AR 2025-26 p 21 fn 11). Earlier reports added that the audits "do not cover all entities and the results may not be representative of the whole population".
Regulator Review's assessment: this is a valuable number, and the ANAO deserves credit for producing and publishing it. No other body Regulator Review has reviewed so far tests its own headline figures this way. It also means the 92% headline should not be read at face value: on the ANAO's own sample audits, about one in four self-reported implementations were incomplete. The ANAO marks the implementation measure as met on the self-reported figure.
5.3 Consequence
The ANAO has no power to require implementation. The JCPAA examines every report and holds inquiries; in 2025-26 "the committee commenced eight inquiries covering 15 Auditor-General reports" (AR 2025-26 p 1). That is a feature of the law, not a failing of the ANAO.
6. The people it is there for
6.1 Parliament
The JCPAA's feedback in 2025-26: "The Committee thanks the ANAO for the high quality of its reports and analysis, and for the professionalism with which its officials engage with the Committee" (AR 2025-26 p 16). The ANAO says it "addressed all 13 priority topics identified by the JCPAA. Three topics commenced as audits during 2025-26"; the remaining ten were incorporated into the 2026-27 work program, which "does not necessarily result in an audit being undertaken" (AR 2025-26 p 16).
Requests from individual members and senators are another matter. From 2017-18 to 2024-25 the annual report carried a table of every request and its outcome. In 2024-25 there were 10 requests and none led directly to an audit being commenced; over the five years to 2024-25 the ANAO received 64 requests and commenced work on eight topics (September paper, from AR 2020-21 to AR 2024-25). The 2025-26 annual report has no table and no count (section 9.1). The requests and replies are still published on the ANAO website (anao.gov.au/work-program/requests).
6.2 Audited entities
Surveys of audited entities in 2025-26 recorded positive feedback of 92% (financial statements), 86% (performance audits) and 92% (performance statements) against a target of 70% (AR 2025-26 pp 14, 22). The performance statements figure rests on 17 individual responses from 12 identified entities of the 21 surveyed.
6.3 The public
The public has no right to request an audit, to reasons or to any review. That is the law. What the ANAO offers is a contribution facility on each audit in progress, public consultation on its draft annual work program, and a general feedback and enquiry form. The contribution panel says:
- "The ANAO welcomes members of the public contributing information for consideration when conducting performance audits."
- "While your contribution will be considered, and handled with care, you will not automatically receive feedback about your contribution."
- "Please note that contributions are intermittently monitored."
(anao.gov.au, performance audit pages, read 11 October 2026.)
In 25 annual reports the ANAO has never published how many contributions or approaches it receives from the public, what it does with them, or how many lead to audit work. It has never published a count of complaints about itself. Apart from a procurement complaints page for suppliers and the general feedback form, no complaints process for the ANAO's own conduct was found on its website. The ANAO "does not do media releases or media briefings on its reports" (ACAG, Independence of the Australasian Auditors General Report 2025, p 64).
The September 2026 working paper recorded that the Victorian, Queensland, Western Australian and Tasmanian audit offices and the UK National Audit Office all count public approaches, without any of them being directed by the public (COMPARATORS-AUDIT.md).
Regulator Review's assessment: the law gives the public no standing, and that is not held against the ANAO. Counting what the public sends, and saying what becomes of it, is within the ANAO's control and it does not do it.
7. Willingness to use its powers
An audit office's equivalent of using its powers is choosing hard topics and reporting plainly. On the record:
- It audits integrity bodies (section 4.4), Defence, and the largest Commonwealth programs, and reports adverse conclusions in plain terms.
- It has argued publicly for its own independence and funding, in annual reports and at estimates, since 2018-19 (section 10).
- It cannot audit a government business enterprise without a JCPAA request (s 17(2)). The ANAO describes the JCPAA's 2022 review as recommending "enabling the Auditor-General to undertake audits of performance statements and government business enterprises at their discretion, rather than upon executive or parliamentary request" (AR 2024-25 p 4). That is a feature of the law.
- Under s 37 the Attorney-General can certify that information must not be included in a public report. In 2018 Thales Australia sought such a certificate over the ANAO's audit of the Army Protected Mobility Vehicle – Light; the certificate was received on 29 June 2018 (AR 2017-18 pp 30, 80; AR 2018-19 p 85). ACAG reports that the certificate is "effective indefinitely" (ACAG 2025, p 65).
- Its response to funding pressure has been to cut the discretionary program and not to expand performance statements audits. Those are the parts of its work that reach furthest.
Regulator Review's assessment: within the topics it chooses, the ANAO uses its powers well. The number of topics it can choose is shrinking, and it has absorbed the shortfall there.
8. Systemic impact
This is what the ANAO is for, and on the record it delivers it. Its audits regularly address whole-of-government systems (procurement, grants, fraud and corruption control, performance reporting), and in 2025-26 it published "four reports summarising themes and lessons" and "three insights products" (AR 2025-26 p 2). It cites the APSC integrity audit (Report 43 of 2023-24) as an example of impact (AR 2025-26 p 17). Recommendations are agreed at 96%, and its implementation test (section 5.2) gives Parliament a check on whether agreement turns into action.
Against that, the reach of the work is narrowing (section 4), and the most prominent automated administrative failure of the period was established by the courts and a Royal Commission, not by an audit (section 4.4).
9. Transparency about itself
The ANAO publishes more about its own performance than most bodies reviewed: targets and results for each measure, agreement and implementation rates, the results of its own implementation tests, and a dated list of parliamentary requests on its website. It discloses corrections, for example: "a recommendation was double-counted in the ANAO Annual Report 2023-24" (AR 2025-26 p 21, Table 3.3 note a).
The 2025-26 report reports less than the year before.
9.1 What stopped being published
| Item | Last published | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Table of audit requests from parliamentarians, with the outcome of each | 2024-25 (10 requests, Table 3A.4). None in 2025-26 | AR 2024-25 pp 33, 42-44; AR 2025-26 |
| Measure: requests from parliamentarians answered within 28 days (target 90%) | 2024-25 | AR 2024-25 p 33 |
| Number of performance measures | 17 in 2022-23 and 2023-24; 9 in 2025-26, partly by folding former measures into one impact measure with six reporting mechanisms | AR 2023-24 pp 40, 43; AR 2025-26 pp 2, 13-14 |
| Summary of every tabled audit | 2013-14; selected audits only in 2014-15; none from 2015-16 | AR 2013-14 Appendix; AR 2014-15 App 2 |
| Average elapsed time per performance audit (target 10 months) | 2021-22, after two years not met (10.5 and 10.2 months) | AR 2020-21 p 27; AR 2021-22 Measure 9 |
| JCPAA satisfaction survey | Discontinued 2023-24 "due to low participation rates"; replaced by the JCPAA agreeing with six statements the ANAO puts to it | AR 2023-24 p 40; AR 2025-26 p 16 |
| Count of modified (qualified) audit opinions | 2016-17 | AR 2016-17 p 37 |
| Public approaches and complaints about the ANAO | Never published | AR 2001-02 to AR 2025-26 |
No reason was found in the 2025-26 report for dropping the requests table. On the new impact measure the ANAO says "we introduced performance measure 1 in the 2025-26 Corporate Plan to provide a more systematic basis for assessing how we measure and assess our impact" (AR 2025-26 p 13).
9.2 Changed definitions and lowered targets
- Cost measures: "A revised methodology was introduced for the 2025-26 reporting period for measures 4, 6 and 9 … These measures now consider CPI, whereas results reported for these measures in previous years did not apply CPI" (AR 2025-26 p 25). Applied to all three cost measures, the new method reports the missed performance audit cost measure as 2% over target rather than the 6% nominal rise.
- Findings agreed and findings addressed: footnote 6 says the method "has changed in 2025-26"; footnote 9 says it "was revised in 2025-26" (AR 2025-26). The ANAO gives consistency across its audit products as the reason.
- Recommendation agreement: qualified agreement counts from 2023-24 (section 5.1).
- Implementation test: basis widened in 2024-25 to include "partly implemented" (section 5.2).
- Performance statements timeliness: target lowered from 100% to 85% after a 48% result, stated as aligning with the financial statements target (section 3).
- Performance audit count: worded "38 to 42 audit reports" for 2025-26 and "Between 38 and 42 audit and other reports" for 2026-27. The plan describes its changes to measures as "minor editorial changes … do not materially affect the intent" (Corporate Plan 2026-27, Changes to performance measures since the portfolio budget statements).
- Two mechanisms are targeted "Satisfied" and marked met (AR 2025-26 p 14). For 2026-27 these qualitative mechanisms form Measure 1 on their own, and the numeric mechanisms move to Measure 2 (Corporate Plan 2026-27).
9.3 Inconsistencies
- Notes to two 2025-26 cost tables say results are assessed "after adjusting for CPI", but the figures shown (-2% and -17%) are the nominal changes (calc: 183,557 / 187,212; 510,401 / 615,849) (AR 2025-26 pp 25-26, 30).
- The independence ranking is described as reflecting low scores on "financial and managerial autonomy" (p 3) and on "financial and administrative autonomy, and freedom to decide the content of reports" (p 75).
- Older restatements without explanation: 2015-16 fully agreed 94% later shown as 97%; implementation of 2019-20 recommendations given as 86% and later 84% (AR 2015-16 p 41; AR 2018-19 p 26; AR 2021-22; AR 2022-23 p 32).
These are recorded as printed. None changes the findings above.
Regulator Review's assessment: the ANAO remains more open about itself than most bodies reviewed, and the implementation test is exemplary. But the direction in 2025-26 is the familiar one: fewer measures, a lowered target where the result was poor, a changed method that reports a missed result as a smaller miss, and the removal from the annual report of the one table showing what happened when members of Parliament asked for an audit.
10. Money and independence
| Year | Total expenses $m | Revenue from government $m | Net result $m | Average staffing | Performance audits |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2018-19 | 81.0 | 70.0 | -6.0 | 335 | 48 |
| 2020-21 | 78.6 | 68.6 | -5.7 | 310 | 42 |
| 2022-23 | 95.0 | 84.2 | -4.3 | 361 | 40 |
| 2024-25 | 108.6 | 96.9 | -6.5 | 451 | 44 |
| 2025-26 | 106.3 | 99.2 | -0.8 | 434 | 39 |
Sources: September dataset (AR 2018-19 to AR 2024-25); AR 2025-26 pp 32-33, 116.
- The ANAO has recorded a net deficit every year since 2018-19. In 2025-26 it "had sought approval from the Finance Minister for a forecast operating loss of $6.5 million" and reduced the actual loss to $0.768m by cutting the performance audit target and through attrition and controlled recruitment (AR 2025-26 pp 2, 32).
- In 2025-26 it spent 67% of its budget on employee-related expenses and 18% on contractors and consultants. Five audit firms were among its largest non-consultancy suppliers (GST inclusive): EY $4.552m, PwC $3.754m, Deloitte $2.430m, Crowe $2.118m and KPMG $1.724m (AR 2025-26 pp 32, 92).
- The JCPAA, 25 March 2025: "The current funding model for ANAO is simply not sustainable due to the continuing and growing cost pressures". The ANAO had sought $96.1m over the forward estimates.
- The JCPAA, 12 May 2026: "The long-term financial position of ANAO continues to be uncertain and this has troubled the JCPAA for some years." It supported "a protected increase of $10.5 million per annum to its base funding, commencing in 2026-27" as a priority, and noted that "The Australian Government's expenditure over the past decade has grown at more than twice the rate of the appropriation available to the ANAO for performance auditing."
- The 2026-27 Budget: "The ANAO has no budget measures in the 2026-27 budget." Appropriation for the performance audit program falls from $40.597m (2025-26) to $37.408m (2026-27); average staffing falls to 421; deficits are forecast in every year to 2029-30 (Portfolio Budget Statements 2026-27 pp 90-94, 103).
- Independence: Australia's score in the ACAG assessment was 70%, and its rank fell from seventh in 2020 to ninth in 2025 of 12. Its weakest principles were financial, managerial and administrative autonomy (55%) and freedom to decide the content and timing of reports (53%) (ACAG 2025, executive summary p 6 and p 64).
- JCPAA Report 491, Review of the Auditor-General Act 1997, was tabled on 31 March 2022 with 27 recommendations. The government has not responded. The Speaker's schedule at 30 June 2026 lists the report as "Partial response received", but the only responses listed are the ANAO's own executive minutes on the recommendations directed to it, and ACAG records that "The government is yet to respond to recommendations" (ACAG 2025, p 65). The ANAO reports that all recommendations directed to it have been implemented (AR 2025-26 p 73). The Auditor-General wrote: "I look forward to the government's response to the JCPAA's recommendations" (AR 2025-26 p 3).
The funding decisions and the missing government response belong to the government, not the ANAO, and are not held against it. They are central to understanding its performance.
11. Assessment and proposed grade
Findings of fact are in sections 1 to 10. This section is Regulator Review's assessment.
Scale used: A excellent; B good; C adequate; D poor; E failing; F not performing the function.
| Criterion | Grade | Reason |
|---|---|---|
| 1. Doing the core job: auditing the Commonwealth's accounts and reporting to Parliament | B | All 243 mandated financial statements audits completed; quality frameworks found effective; reports praised by the JCPAA. Held back by on-time delivery below target (81% against 85%; performance statements 48% against 100%) |
| 2. Service to the people it is there for | C | Parliament's committee is well served, but the program is 9 audits below what Parliament asked for and MPs' requests rarely produce an audit. The public has a contribution facility that is "intermittently monitored", no feedback as of right and no published count |
| 3. Willingness to use its powers | C | Hard topics are audited and reported plainly, including integrity bodies. But the funding shortfall has been absorbed by cutting the discretionary program, and an MP's 2017 request to examine Robodebt did not produce an audit |
| 4. Systemic impact | B | Whole-of-government audits and lessons products; recommendations agreed at 96%; the only body Regulator Review has reviewed so far that sample-tests whether reported implementation is real. Reach narrowing as output falls |
| 5. Transparency about itself | C | Better than most: targets, results, corrections and the implementation test are published. But 2025-26 dropped the parliamentary requests table and the 28-day measure, cut measures from 17 to 9, applied a new cost method that reports a missed result as a smaller miss, and lowered a target after a poor result; the ANAO has never counted public approaches or complaints about itself |
| 6. Accountability | B | A standing Independent Auditor, close JCPAA oversight, corrections published, recommendations directed to it implemented. Only one Independent Auditor performance audit since the 2020 budgeting audit (capability, 2022); a second, on financial sustainability, is due late 2026. The FOI exemption and the absence of a government response to Report 491 are not held against it |
Proposed overall grade: C.
Reasoning. The criterion closest to the ANAO's core job, auditing the Commonwealth's accounts and reporting to Parliament, carries the most weight, and on it the ANAO performs well. That is why it is not D. It is not B because the part of its work that gives the prospect of audit its force, the discretionary performance audit program, is at its lowest level in 25 years apart from the 2015-16 dissolution year, and below what Parliament asked for; because the public has no counted or reported channel to it; and because its reporting about itself went backwards in 2025-26. Much of the shortfall is driven by funding that the government, not the ANAO, controls, and the JCPAA has said so repeatedly. The grade reflects what the ANAO delivers and how it reports it, not why.
What would change the grade:
- Up: performance audits restored to 48 a year (which on the JCPAA's view requires the government to fund it); performance statements audits on time; the parliamentary requests table and the 28-day measure restored to the annual report; the implementation test reported each year on a stable basis, alongside the self-reported measure; a published count of public contributions and approaches and what came of them; a complaints process for the ANAO's own conduct.
- Down: a further fall in performance audits; further measures dropped or targets lowered after misses; an adverse finding in the Independent Auditor's financial sustainability review.
12. What is not known
- How many contributions and approaches the public sends, and how many lead to audit work. Never published.
- Complaints about the ANAO. Never published.
- What information was withheld from the 2018 Protected Mobility Vehicle – Light report under the s 37 certificate.
- The outcome of the Independent Auditor's review of the ANAO's financial sustainability framework, expected late 2026.
- Whether the government will respond to Report 491; the next Speaker's schedule is due around November 2026.
- The 2025-26 financial statements and their audit report (within AR 2025-26 pp 34-68) and the Independent Auditor's report on the performance statements (pp 9-10) are image-only in the PDF and were not read; reserves and equity notes are therefore not reported here.
- What share of financial statements audit work is done by contracted firms. Not published as a series.
13. Sources
- Australian National Audit Office, Annual Reports 2001-02 to 2025-26. https://www.anao.gov.au/pubs/annual-reports (2025-26: https://www.anao.gov.au/work/annual-report/anao-annual-report-2025-26)
- ANAO Corporate Plan 2026-27 (22 July 2026). https://www.anao.gov.au/work/corporate/anao-corporate-plan-2026-27
- ANAO web pages read 11 October 2026: About the ANAO; The Auditor-General; Contact; performance audit pages ("Contribute to this audit"); Work program requests; External audits and reviews; Resolution of the Senate requesting the ANAO reinstate the Defence MPR (with the Auditor-General's letter of 23 April 2026 and advice of 8 December 2025); Centrelink's automated debt recovery programs (request, reply of 27 June 2017).
- Auditor-General Report No. 41 of 2021-22, Management of Complaints by the Office of the Commonwealth Ombudsman; No. 4 of 2018-19, Operational Efficiency of the Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity; No. 28 of 2022-23, Debt Management and Recovery in Services Australia; Procurement by the National Anti-Corruption Commission (in progress).
- Auditor-General Act 1997 (Cth), compilation 18. https://www.legislation.gov.au/C2004A05248/latest/versions
- Public Accounts and Audit Committee Act 1951 (Cth), ss 8, 8A.
- Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit: Budget Day Statement on the ANAO's draft estimates, 25 March 2025 and 12 May 2026; Public Statement, Major Projects Report, 6 March 2026; Report 491, Review of the Auditor-General Act 1997 (31 March 2022) and its government response page. https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/Public_Accounts_and_Audit
- Speaker's Schedule of the Status of Government Responses to Committee Reports, as at 30 June 2026. https://www.aph.gov.au/SpeakersSchedule
- Auditor-General, opening statements to the Senate Finance and Public Administration Legislation Committee, October 2025 and 9 February 2026.
- Prime Minister and Cabinet Portfolio Budget Statements 2026-27, ANAO section. https://www.pmc.gov.au
- Australasian Council of Auditors-General, Independence of the Australasian Auditors General Report 2025 (Deakin University, November 2025). https://www.acag.org.au
- Prime Minister, Appointment of new Auditor-General for Australia (media release, 2024). https://www.pm.gov.au/media/appointment-new-auditor-general-australia
- Royal Commission into the Robodebt Scheme, Report (July 2023).
- Regulator Review working papers: The Australian National Audit Office, measured by its own numbers (19 September 2026), with EXTRACT-ANAO.md, COMPARATORS-AUDIT.md and VERIFICATION-AUDIT.md.